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Roots of Islamic Reformism
The roots of Islamic reformism in the subcon-
tinent can be traced to the eighteenth century
and the decline of the Mughal empire and to
the emergence of British colonialism. Central to
these are the ideas of Shah Wali Allah (1703-63)
and his son Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1824). Their
influence was felt through a variety of move-
ments ranging from the Tariqa-i-Muham-
madiyya of Syed Ahmed Barelwi to the ulema
who founded the great seminary of dar-ul-
Uloom at Deoband. Though the school was ini-
tially politically inactive, many of its teachers
and students became influenced by the call of
pan-Islamism from Istanbul. Foremost among
these was Maulana Mehmood-ul-Hassan (1852-
1921). The main thrust of his movement was the
declaration that India was d a r - u l - h a r b; territory
of war requiring a j i h a d. He was among the
founders of the J a m i a t - u l e m a - e - H i n d ( O r g a n i z a-
tion of the Ulemas of India), which participated
shoulder-to-shoulder with Mahatma Gandhi
and the Congress in the Khilafat movement, in
support of the Caliph and the conservative
Deobandis, who believed that India could
remain united as a federation of communities,
remained aligned with the Congress in the
ensuing decades and opposed the formation of
Pakistan. Many saw Pakistan as an idea put for-
ward by westernized Muslims and many were
not unaware that any scheme of partition would
leave large numbers of Muslims in India. How-
ever, some Deobandis who founded the J a m i a t -
ulema-i-Islam (JUUI) at a meeting in Calcutta in
1945, supported the formation of Pakistan.
The idea of Pakistan was not acceptable
either to Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi who, in
1941, founded the Jamaat-e-Islami who saw it
as a Muslim state rather than the Islamic one he
wanted. In all fairness, that is exactly how the
Qaid-e-Azam, Mohammed Ali Jinnah envi-
sioned Pakistan. Maudoodi advocated the idea
of the Nizam-e-Mustafa or a system, as he per-
ceived it, to be ruled the way it was in the time
of Prophet Mohammed.
After Partition
With Partition, many organizations split. The
entire JUUI went over to Pakistan while the
J a m i a t - u l - u l e m a - i - H i n d, remained headquar-
tered in India. The Jamaat-e-Islami split and the
Indian branch came under the influence of the
nationalist Deboandis and accepted and even
lauded the secular ideal as a means of preserv-
ing minority culture and focused on education
and social uplift of the community. J a m a a t - e -
I s l a m i Kashmir had an ambivalent attitude
towards politics. It participated in several state
assembly elections, the last one being in 1987.
The Pakistani branch headed by Maudoodi,
on the other hand, became active in what can
be called ÔIslamicÕ politics, beginning in the
1950s with the instigation of riots against the
Ahmadiya community. In the past three
decades, the organization has become the core
of radicalism and fundamentalism in Pakistan.
It played an important role in the campaign
against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and then supported
the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq. The
Pakistani dictator skilfully used his alliance with
the J a m a a t to strengthen his position.
Turning on India
In the years after Independence, organiza-
tions of Indian and Pakistani Muslims kept a
wary distance from each other. However, the
sharp increase in the wealth of the Arabian
Peninsula led to an enhancement of Wahhabi
influence on Indian Muslims. This effort was
spearheaded by preachers who collected funds
from the Arabs to run m a d r a s a s (schools) and
other organizations in service of the communi-
ty. The US-supported jihad against the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan led to the radicalization of
Indian Islam as well through the enhanced
interest of Saudi Arabia in the region and the
activity of fundamentalist preachers in India
and Bangladesh, many receiving funds from the
Arabian peninsula. Quietistic movements like
the J a m i a t - e - A h l e - H a d i t h (Organization of those
upholding Hadith to the exclusion of all juristic
schools of Islam) and the Tablighi Jamaat
became militant, spawning off organizations
like the Markaz Dawa-ul-Irshad (Centre for Spiri-
tual Guidance) and the H a r k a t - u l - A n s a r ( M o v e-
ment of Helpers).
But the major impetus for external involve-
ment in India came from PakistanÕs external
intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelli-
gence (ISI). Under General Akhtar Abdul
Rehman, the agency had perfected the tech-
nique of using religious fundamentalists to fight
the Russians in Afghanistan. With the outbreak
of the revolt in Kashmir 1989-1990 they decided
to use them for the cause of Pakistan. General
Akhtar was dead. He perished in the same plane
crash as General Zia-ul-Haq, but his successors,
Lieutenant Generals Hamid Gul and Javid Nasir,
proved equal to the task.
Their task was not too difficult. The J a m a a t - e -
I s l a m i, Pakistan, and its counter-part group in
the Valley were both for the accession of Jammu
and Kashmir to Pakistan. However, the uprising
was led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
Front, a secular formation, seeking indepen-
dence. In 1990-1991, the ISI systematically
starved the JKLF of funds and built up the H i z b u l
M u j a h i d e e n, a militant group created by the
J a m a a t - e - I s l a m i.
To enhance the combat efficiency of the
group, its members were trained alongside the
Afghan mujahideen owing allegiance to the
H i z b - e - I s l a m i of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. After the
fall of Najibullah, Hekmatyar sent a number of
his fighters to fight alongside the Kashmiri and
Pakistani cadres of the Hizbul Mujahideen. In
1993-1994 the Indian ArmyÕs tough response
resulted in great setbacks to the Hizb and the ISI
began to explore other options as well.
Principal among these were two groups who
had been involved in the Afghan j i h a d . T h e
Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami International (HUJI) had
been founded in 1980 by the J a m i a t - u l - u l e m a -
Islam and the Tablighi Jamaat of Pakistan to run
relief camps for the Afghan m u j a h i d e e n. It was
led by Maulvi Irshad Ahmed and its support
base lay in the Punjabi business community
with JUUI and Tablighi Jamaat a f f i l i a t i o n s .
As the war developed, it established links with
the ISI and was subcontracted to recruit and
train the mujahids as well. The HUJI developed
links with the Afghanistani H i z b - e - I s l a m i ( Y u n u s
Khalis) faction. After the death of Maulana
Irshad Ahmed, shahid (martyred) in the j i h a d,
there was a poser-struggle within the organiza-
tion. Fazal-ur-Rehman Khalil, the commander-
in-chief of the group split with the new A m i r,
Qazi Saifullah Akhtar and formed a new outfit
Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HKUM) which retained
the connection with the Khalis faction of t h e
Hizb-e-Islami and its military commander,
Jalaluddin Haqqani located in the Khost area
where they were permitted to retain training
camps. These camps, many set up during the
US- Saudi- Pakistani j i h a d against the Russians
in Afghanistan, were destroyed by American
cruise missiles in August 1998 as a reprisal of the
bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tan-
zania by a group owing allegiance to Saudi mil-
lionaire and now anti-American mujahid O s a m a
bin Laden.
The HKUM sent a lashkar (war party) into Kash-
mir under Sajjad Khan, a Pakistani national, also
known as Sajjad Afghani. He set up a training
camp near Srinagar, but he was not able to
establish effective links with the local groups
and returned to Pakistan. The first HUJI lashkars
began entering the state in early 1992. Later that
year, Nasarullah Mansur Langaryal, its deputy
chief commander and Afghan war veteran was
sent in to head the lashkar. 
In 1991 the Deobandi ulemas of Karachi asked
the two Harkats to reunite so as to prosecute the
Kashmir jihad more effectively. This was done
and the Harkat-ul-Ansar was born in October
1993. The General Secretary of the new organi-
zation, Mohammed Masood Azhar was sent to
India on a Portugese passport to work out the
details of the merger between the Langaryal and
Sajjad AfghaniÕs lashkars. Unfortunately for
them, all three were arrested in quick succesion.
The arrest of their top leaders derailed the
HarkatÕs planning in the Valley. In the next year
or so, they became involved in making efforts for
their release through four separate incidents of
kidnapping. In the first case, an Army road-build-
ing engineer was kidnapped and then executed
when the government refused to trade him for
the Harkat leaders. 
The following year, Qari Zarrar, a Pakistani
who was heading the Harkat in the Valley and
Abdul Hameed Turki (from Turkey) an associate
of Langaryal, decided to take matters into their
own hands. They organized the kidnapping of
five foreigners, of whom one, John Childs, man-
aged to escape. Another, Hans Christian Ostro,
was executed and his body left in a place where
it could be found by the authorities. The four
others- American Donald Hutchings, German
Dirk Hasert, and Britons Keith Mangan and Paul
Wells Ð are believed to have been executed fol-
lowing TurkiÕs death in an encounter with the
Indian Army in late 1995. This episode, and sub-
sequent internecine quarrels affected the
Harkat-ul-AnsarÕs combat capabilities.
With the H a r k a t coming apart, the ISI has now
put all its bets on yet another pan-Islamic group,
the Markaz Dawa-ul-Irshad and its military wing,
the L a s h k a r - e - T a i b a (Army of the Pure). Among
the fundamentalist sects that backed the
Afghan j i h a d, was the Jamiat Ahle Hadith, an
ultra-orthodox grouping of organizations who
accept the austere Wahabi practices of Saudi
A r a b i a .
Saudi money channeled through Sheikh Abu
Abdul Aziz helped set up the Markaz which is
headquartered at Muridke, near Lahore in 1987.
Its founders were three university teachers, Zafar
Iqbal, Hafiz Mohammed Sayeed and Abdullah
Azam. This organization has institutional links
with the Jamiat-ul-ulema Islam of Pakistan head-
ed by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, a former Senator
in the PakistanÕs parliament and a political ally of
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Its principal aims,
according to its founders, are jihad and preach-
ing. But while many are involved in preaching,
the Markaz is one of the few that still stresses
jihad. However, its main battle-ground is Kash-
mir. The first fighters were sent into Kashmir in
early 1993 through the Islami Inquilabi Mahaz.
Later it associated with the Al Barq, a Valley Kash-
miri group. But since the beginning of 1994, it
has been sending its fighters under the banner
of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Currently, of an estimat-
ed 300 fighters in the Valley, some 90 per cent
are Pakistanis.
The A h l e - H a d i t h movement, stressing ÔpureÕ
Wahhabi Islam, has found support among some
of the ulema in India. Nevertheless, the conserv-
ative mainstream Deobandis do not see India as
a D a r - u l - h a r b since Muslim life is still run by their
own Personal Law. The Indian Muslims suffer
from many of the infirmities afflicting their Pak-
istani counterparts, primarily poverty and illiter-
acy. Some of them are falling prey to fundamen-
talist preachers and sects, many of whom had
links with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Not sur-
prisingly, the Pakistani intelligence agency has
been using some of them as a cover for its activ-
i t i e s .
The key watershed for the attitude of many
Indian Muslims, especially in northern India, has
been the the destruction of the Babri Masjid by
a mob of Hindu fanatics in December 1992.
They cited as their reason a belief that the
mosque had been erected by the first Moghul
Emperor Babur in the sixteenth century after
razing a temple commemorating the birth-
place of Rama, one of the most popular gods of
the Hindu pantheon. The emotive campaign
roiled the politics of northern India and set the
stage for the collapse of the Indian National
Congress. It also led to horrific riots in which the
minority Muslim community paid a dispropor-
tionate cost in terms of loss of life and property.
The worst occurrences were in Mumbai follow-
ing the destruction of the Mosque in December
1992, followed by another round in January
1993. In retaliation, as it were, elements of the
MumbaiÕs Muslim underworld, with the help of
the ISI, carried out a series of bomb blasts across
the city in March 1993, arguably the worst act of
urban terrorism in recent history.
Pan-Islamic groups see all this as an opportu-
nity. Both the Markaz dawa-ul-Irshad a n d
H a r k a t - u l - A n s a r (it has reverted to H a r k a t - u l -
M u j a h i d e e n after the American proscription in
1997), make it clear that Kashmir is merely a
gateway for a larger j i h a d in India. To this they
have expanded their network across the coun-
try. Mosques and m a u l v i s (teachers) owing alle-
giance to the A h l e - H a d i t h sect are a major link
for an underground terrorist network run by the
HUA and MDI in collaboration with the ISI. These
stretch from Bangladesh, across West Bengal,
northern Bihar and Uttar Pradesh to Delhi. Both
Nepal and Bangladesh have been used as a base
by these groups and, across India, Debandi
madrasahs are a target of subversion and a
source of recruitment. Information on this
development has come through those arrested
for the bombing campaign that saw nearly a
hundred bomb blasts across northern India in
1996-97, taking the lives of scores of people.
Islamic fundamentalism and militancy are
now a fact of life in South Asia. Whether or not
forces of modernization will moderate their
impact is difficult to tell. The steady decline of
the StateÕs ability to influence the every-day life
of the citizens of the region is playing an impor-
tant role in the growth of fundamentalism.
Political parties, especially in Pakistan, take
quick recourse to hoisting the flag of Islamiza-
tion to handle problems. To compound things,
there is a new factor that must now be taken
into account Ð the success of the Taliban in
establishing control over Afghanistan. '
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